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Platonic Ontology and Stereometry:  
Evidence from the Philebus and the Laws
Chiye Izumi
I deal first with the Philebus, which introduces the four-fold classification of 
reality, namely, limit, unlimited, generation into reality, and causes. It is this 
classification which plays a crucial role in Plato's later ontology where intelligibility 
depends heavily upon the role of limit. Limit in turn is glossed in terms of number and 
measure or, rather more importantly, ratios within them. Ratio theory (the theory of 
proportion) is generally thought to have developed from a notion that is applicable only 
to commensurable magnitudes to one that encompasses ratios and proportions also 
between incommensurable ones.1  So insofar as limit is exemplified by ratios (between 
number and number, or measure and measure) that can go beyond the commensurable 
cases and include some incommensurables, viz. the ratios between them. Although the 
Philebus does not explicitly mention stereometry, the notion of limit in the Philebus has 
important implications for the topic of incommensurability, which is one of the subjects 
to which stereometry is applied in Plato's later thought. 
Second, I shall deal with the Laws, where the classification of maq»mata is very 
different from that of the Republic. The Laws does not seem to presuppose the sequence 
of mathematical objects (numbers, planes, solids and moving solids and moving 
numbers) which the Republic presents when it introduces stereometry. Moreover, the 
Laws does not regard stereometry as an independent mavqhma as the Republic does. 
Stereometry is included in the art of measurement (metrhtik»)which is defined as the 
subject dealing with 'line, plane and depth', and the art of measurement is explicitly 
related to the study of incommensurability (Laws 817e ff). I shall compare the 
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configuration of maq»mata of the Laws to that of the Republic, and discuss the relation 
between the art of measurement and stereometry. This will help to illustrate further 
aspects of stereometry's contribution to the resolution of problems connected with 
incommensurability. Moreover, I shall use a study of the relation between the art of 
measurement and the study of numbers, to investigate where the configuration of 
maq»mata as it appears in the Laws diverges from and also where it develops earlier 
ideas.  
1. The Philebus: the fourfold classification of reality and the new 
framework of mathematical studies and its emphasis on 
commensurability 
The Philebus  shows us a certain development of the Timaean motif that 'the Demiurge 
creates the universe out of numbers and shapes', and the development seems to correlate 
with the problem of incommensurability which is not fully discussed in the Timaeus.
The fourfold classification of reality which Plato introduced in the Philebus (limit, 
unlimited, generation into reality and causes) seems to reflect not merely the so-called 
Pythagorean doctrine of Limit and Unlimited which is here referred to as 'heavenly 
tradition', but also Plato's insight into ratio theory which is being applied to 
incommensurable quantities. The following passage which describes the class of the 
limit deserves attention:  
Socrates: 'The things which do not admit of more and less and 
the like, but do admit of all that is opposed to them - first 
equality and the equal, then the double, and all that is related as 
number to number or measure to measure - all these might 
properly be assigned to the class of the limit. Do you agree ?' 
Protarchus: 'Completely.' (Philebus 25b) 
It seems important to note that Plato does not describe the class of the limit  in terms of 
merely numbers and shapes, -- which, we should recall, are the key terms in the 
Timaean motif that 'the Demiurge creates the universe out of numbers and shapes'.2
While numbers and shapes play in the Timaeus the crucial role for giving orderliness to 
the chaotic state of the universe, they do not play the same role in the Philebus.  Instead 
of 'numbers and shapes', the Philebus emphasises the relation between 'number to 
number' and 'measure to measure'. Moreover, it should be noted that the term 'shapes' 
does not appear in the above passage but instead the word 'measure' does. The 
replacement of 'shapes' by 'measures' and also the emphasis on the concept 'relation' 
between 'number to number' and 'measure and measure'  can be construed as an 
indication that what may lie behind this passage is the theory of proportion, particularly 
in its application to the case of incommensurables. Knorr reads the above passage in the 
light of the problems concerning the measurement of incommensurable quantities. He 
says: 'Not all incommensurable lines are expressible as rational combination of 1 and 
square root of  2...  In the incommensurable case, the measures themselves will be 
incommensurable. Plato also seems to refer to such a notion, when in the Philebus (25a 
ff) he speaks of the relation of "number to number and measure to measure" '.3
Moreover, as for the possibility that  the problems concerning the measurement of 
incommensurable quantities might have lain behind the fourfold classification of reality 
in the Philebus, we may offer the following points. The Timaean key terms, viz., 
numbers and shapes, seem too weak to deal with the problems of incommensurable 
quantities. Likewise, the ontological sequence of mathematical objects (numbers, 
planes, solids, the movement of solids and the movement of numbers) which we find in 
the Republic does not seem useful for resolving the problems of incommensurability. 
Only the fourfold classification of reality as it appears in the Philebus can provide the 
ontological rationale for dealing with the problems of incommensurable quantities.  
The class of the limit gives measures to things which belong to the class of the 
unlimited. While most of Plato's examples are physical ones (hotter, colder, disease, the 
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weather, musical sounds),4  we are to understand that the way in which limit is 
exemplified is via the mathematical concepts of number and measure, and the effect of 
their introduction is to make the 'mixed' class not just 'harmonious' (sÚmfwna, 25e1), 
but precisely, commensurable (summetr…a, 25e1, cf. 26a8, 65a2, 66b1, œmmetron 26a7). 
We should not fail to remark that the addition of the more generic term 'mevtron' to the 
more specifically arithmetic ' ¢riqmÒj ' at 25a8-b1 allows coverage of commensurables 
of all types, including geometrical ones and ones dealing with other continua such as 
that of musical sound, over and above those summetr…a that may be expressed as ratios 
between integers. Thus, even incommensurable ratios can be understood by means of 
the notion of proportion.5  This may be a crucial background to the ontology and 
epistemology set out in the Philebus.  In the ending of the Philebus (66a ff.), where 
Plato divides what he calls 'possessions (ktÁma)' of mankind into five, on a scale of 
decreasing value, we find clearly that the concept 'mštron' wins the first prize; 
'proportion (sÚmmetron)' comes second, and 'intelligence (noàj)' comes third. Although 
this order does not  satisfy scholars believing the primacy of ethical values over 
mathematical ideas,6  we might suggest that the ordering clearly reflects the essence of 
the limit as we saw above. 
The emphasis on the relation of 'number to number' and 'measure to measure' 
seems to influence the classification of mathematical subjects later in the Philebus.
Although it is well-known that in the Philebus Plato tries to divide mathematical 
subjects into two types, namely broadly empirical ones and theoretical ones, I would 
suggest, rather,  the following remarks at Philebus 55e also demand attention here: 'If 
someone were to take away arithmetic, the art of measurement, and weighing from the 
arts and crafts, the rest might be said to be worthless'. Here it seems that the Philebus
does not suppose the Republic -type framework of the five mathematical subjects (the 
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perfection, sufficiency, and all that belongs to that class. The third includes intelligence and ' 
frÒnhsij '. 
study of numbers, geometry, stereometry, astronomy and harmonics). When 
mathematical subjects are classified at Philebus 55e, the first two mentioned are the 
study of numbers and the art of measurement. Thus far this primary twofold division 
corresponds to the two kinds of mathematical entities referred to in the description of 
the class of the limit at 25a-b, namely numbers and measure. Indeed that these are the 
primary mathematical subjects is confirmed when, at 57d it is said that true philosophers 
are immeasurably superior in accuracy and truth about measures and numbers. There 
are two arts of arithmetic and two arts of measuring, divided according to their degree of 
accuracy and abstraction. 
Thus, concerning the framework of mathematical studies, the Philebus contains 
elements which neither the Republic nor the Timaeus suggests. The emphasis on 
'numbers and measures' and also on the art of measurement is not found in those two 
works.7 Those emphases can be taken as an indication of the tendency towards a new 
view of mathematical subjects found in both the Laws and the Epinomis.
2. The Laws
Here the Laws must be explored: stereometry appears in  Laws VII as a part of the art 
of measurement dealing with commensurable/incommensurable relations between lines, 
planes and solids; moreover, the Laws emphasises the concepts 'number and measure', 
which are also emphasised in the Philebus,  not only in worldly problems but also in 
the cosmic perspective. 
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2.1 Laws VII 819d-820c: what is indicated by commensurable / 
incommensurable relations between 'line', 'plane' and 'depth' ? 
When Plato introduces in Laws VII three mathematical studies for free-born children 
(the three mathematical studies being the study of numbers, the art of measurement and 
astronomy), he abruptly refers to the 'shameful Greek ignorance' of what is 
commensurable or not (Laws VII, 819d-e). His claim here is that this ignorance can be 
dispelled by the art of measurement which clarifies commensurable/incommensurable 
between 'line', 'plane' and 'depth'. Although stereometry does not explicitly appear in the 
list of the three mathematical studies in Laws VII, it seems possible to take the art of 
measurement to include stereometry, that is as well as geometry and whatever other 
modes of measurement may be in Plato's mind.  
It is possible, then, that Laws VII can provide us with clues concerning the 
importance of stereometry for problems of incommensurability in Plato's later thought. I 
shall explore the passage from Laws VII 817e to 820e, focussing on the following four 
points: (1) what is indicated by commensurable / incommensurable relations between 
'line', 'plane' and 'depth'; (2) the relation between stereometry and the art of 
measurement; (3) the relation between the art of measurement and the study of 
numbers. 
The description of the art of measurement in Laws VII begins with the lamentation 
of 'our [Greek] ignorance' of the measuring of line, plane and depth (819d). The 
Athenian Stranger who came to perceive the ignorance rather belatedly (Ñyš pote) was 
utterly astounded and compared the ignorance even to 'the condition of guzzling swine 
rather than of human beings'(819d). He says, 'I blushed not for myself alone, but for our 
whole Hellenic world'(819e). Although it seems somewhat exaggerated and even 
humorous, Athenian Stranger's lamentation of the Greek ignorance might indicate 
Plato's keen interest in, and preoccupation with problems relating to the art of 
measurement of line, plane and depth. However, the substance of the ignorance is not 
clear. Cleinias, the interlocutor of the Athenian Stranger, asks him to explain the 
ignorance (819e). Then, the Athenian Stranger begins to do so by asking him questions 
in return. 
Athenian Stranger: 'Pray tell me one little thing. You know what 
is meant by line?' 
Cleinias: 'Of course I do.' 
Athenian Stranger: 'And by surface ?' 
Cleinias: 'Certainly.' 
Athenian Stranger: 'And do you know that they are two distinct 
things, and that the third thing, next to these, is depth ?' 
Cleinias: 'I do'. 
Athenian Stranger: 'Do you not, then, believe that all these are 
commensurable one with another ?' 
Cleinias: 'Yes.' (Laws VII, 819e) 
Although Cleinias thus answers 'Yes' to the leading question of whether all  (line, plane 
and depth ) are commensurable one with another (p£nta metrht¦ prÕj ¥llhla), the 
problem centres on his agreement 'all'.  But the correction of Cleinias by the Athenian 
stranger shows that Cleinias is represented as not realising there are any instances of 
incommensurables at all. The Athenian Stranger, then, continues to ask Cleinias the 
following cases.
(1) Line is in its very nature commensurable with line, surface with surface, 
depth with depth.�(MÁkÒj te o�mai prÕj mÁkoj, kaˆ pl£toj prÕj pl£toj,
kaˆ b£qoj æsaÚtwj dunatÕn e�nai metre‹n fÚsei..) (819e14-820a2)
(2) Some of them are neither with more assurance, nor with less, 
commensurable, some being commensurable and some not. E„ d' œsti m»te 
sfÒdra m»te ºršma dunat¦ œnia, ¢ll¦ t¦ mšn, t¦ d� m».) (820a4-5)
(3) As regards the relation of line and surface to depth, or of surface and line to 
each other, these might be somehow commensurable with one another.�(MÁkÒj 
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te o�mai prÕj mÁkoj, kaˆ pl£toj prÕj pl£toj, kaˆ b£qoj æsaÚtwj 
dunatÕn e�nai metre‹n fÚsei.) (820a8-12)
I shall now re-assess statement (1). Cleinias in Laws VII regards (1) as 'absolutely 
correct' while the Athenian Stranger avoids making a judgement of whether or not 
Cleinias is right. The least contentious interpretation of (1) may be that each of length, 
area and volume has its own unit of measurement. As Eva Sachs points out, the 
interpretation could be endorsed by some ancient episodes suggesting that the Greeks 
may have made mistakes in dealing with standardised units of measurement. 8
According to Thucydides (6.1.2), most of the Athenians were ignorant of the size of 
Sicily, even though they knew that it took not much less than eight days for the voyage 
round the island; this episode is sometimes taken to suggest that the Greeks made a 
mistake to measure areas by units of lengths. Likewise, Quintilian refers to a similar 
episode that the Greeks regarded the time taken to circumnavigate an island as a 
sufficient indication of its size (1.10.40). If we connect these episodes with statement (1), 
we can take the statement to indicate the mathematical truth which the Greeks should 
have known concerning the units of the measurements, namely that the line should be 
measured by the unit of length, the surface by that of area, the volume by that of volume. 
 However, another interpretation of statement (1) is also possible, if we take 
problems of incommensurability into consideration. Certain lines are incommensurable 
with the unit of length; certain surfaces incommensurable with the unit of area; (certain 
volumes incommensurable with the unit of volume). When such incommensurable 
quantities are observed, it is not true to say that line is measurable with line, surface with 
surface, depth (volume) with depth (volume). Then, statement (1) becomes false, 
although it appears to Cleinias absolutely true.  
This line of interpretation of statement (1) is endorsed by statement (2), that is, 
'some of them (line, surface and volume) are neither with more assurance, nor with less, 
commensurable, some being commensurable and some not (œsti m»te sfÒdra m»te 
ºršma dunat¦ œnia, ¢ll¦ t¦ mšn, t¦ d� m»)'(820a4-5). I would take this statement, 
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though being opaque, to indicate that there are lines (areas, volumes) sfÒdra
commensurable with lines (areas, volumes), while there are lines hjrevma 
commensurable with lines but commensurable in square. The unit of length (areas, 
volumes) is not always valid in the measurements of length (areas, volumes). In this 
sense, statement (2), which gives a counter-example to statement (1), can be regarded as 
true. (We might also notice that the term sfovdra is an echo of Cleinias' over emphatic 
answer ' SfÒdra ge '.) 
Thus, the shift from statement (1) to statement (2) reveals a new dimension, where 
the incommensurability between lines (areas) is to be observed. However, if a volume is 
commensurable with another volume, lines and planes constituting the volumes are not 
necessarily commensurable with one another. Statement (3) says, 'as regards the relation 
of line and surface to depth, or of surface and line to each other, these might be, in some 
way, commensurable with one another (mÁkÒj te kaˆ pl£toj prÕj b£qoj, À pl£toj 
te kaˆ mÁkoj prÕj ¥llhla; [éste pîj] «r' oÙ dianooÚmeqa perˆ taàta oÛtwj 
“Ellhnej p£ntej, æj dunat£ ™sti metre‹sqai prÕj ¥llhla ¡mîj gš pwj;.)'
(820a8-12). 
Concerning statement (3), the Athenian Stranger adds the following comment at 
820b: 'if they (the relation of line and surface to volume, or surface and line to each 
other) cannot be measured by any way or means (mhdamîj mhdamÍ), while, as I said, 
all we Greeks think that they can, are we not right in being ashamed for them all ?' This 
is usually interpreted as a further lamentation of Greek ignorance. However, it does not 
seem a straightforward lamentation. We need to pay attention to the expression 'if they
cannot be measured by any way or means'. If we recall here the Theaetetus passage 
(147b1-148d) discussed above, we might realise that it is not always true that  'they
cannot be measured by any way or means.' Even if a line is not commensurable with the 
unit of length, it can become commensurable by the areas (or volumes) it can form. Yet 
for the Greeks to have assume that all lines are commensurable is clearly a blunder. 
Thus, while the discussion concerning the commensurability of 'line', 'plane' and 
'depth' begins with the problems of the units of measurements, the problems seem to 
develop into a higher study of incommensurability. At 820c, the Athenian stranger 
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te o�mai prÕj mÁkoj, kaˆ pl£toj prÕj pl£toj, kaˆ b£qoj æsaÚtwj 
dunatÕn e�nai metre‹n fÚsei.) (820a8-12)
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8�Eva Sachs 1917: 174 ff. 
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explicitly refers to the study which deals with 'problems concerning the essential nature 
of the commensurable and the incommensurable (T¦ tîn metrhtîn te kaˆ ¢mštrwn 
prÕj ¥llhla Îtini fÚsei gšgonen)'.
It should be noted that the description of the art of measurement in Laws VII thus 
ends with the reference to the study of 'commensurability and incommensurability of 
whatsoever type'. This seems important for our next attempt to elucidate the relation 
between the art of measurement and the study of numbers. 
2.2 The relation between measurement (metrhtik») and arithmetic 
(¢riqmhtik»)
The above depiction of art of measurement (metrhtik») in Laws VII brings us to the 
question which is of central importance for our next discussion about the place of 
stereometry in Plato's later period, the interpretation of the relation between art of 
measurement (metrhtik») and arithmetic (¢riqmhtik»). We have seen, from our 
analysis of Philebus 55e-57a, that both metrhtikhv and ajriqmhtikhv may have a 
practical/ applied and a pure/ philosophical part. The question we shall address in this 
section is how stable and how clear is the distinction between metrhtik»
and ¢riqmhtik». We shall find that the relationship between these two is construed 
differently in different late Platonic texts, and this clearly has a bearing both on the 
classification of the maqhvmata in general  and on the place of stereometry in 
particular, as well as on Plato's views on the problems of commensurability and 
incommensurability.  
There was a famous issue as to whether arithmetic, or geometry, is prior.  The 
chief texts have been set out, but so far as Plato is concerned, Republic VII (526b), Laws 
VII (817e, 819b) are among the more important passages suggesting the primacy of 
arithmetic (cf. also Epinomis 977e to be discussed below),  while the study of the 
general injunction of the need to study geometry to enter the Academy -- along with the 
importance of geometry in the Theaetetus and the Meno -- suggest that , at least from 
some points of view, as much attention is paid to geometry as to arithmetic.9
The evidence just considered suggests a struggle for primacy between arithmetic 
and geometry, with the boundary between them being clearly defined. The picture is 
brought into some doubts, however, when we ask whether the boundary between 
arithmetic (¢riqmhtik») and the art of measurement (metrhtik») is always itself clearly 
drawn. 
There are occasions where the boundary between them seem less clear. For 
example, consider Politicus 284e: 
Eleatic Stranger: 'It's clear we would divide the art of 
measurement, cutting it in two in just the way we said, positing 
as one part of it all those kinds of expertise that measure the 
number, lengths, depths, breadths and speeds of things in 
relation to the opposite, and as the other, all those that measure 
in relation to what is in due measure, what is fitting, the right 
moment, what is as it ought to be -- everything that removes 
itself from the extremes to the middle'. (Politicus 284e2-8)10
                                                                
9�The famous imperative reported by ancient commentators to have been inscribed over the gates 
of Plato's Academy : 'Let no one who is ignorant of geometry enter here' (AGEWMETRHTOS 
MHDEIS EISITW). cf. Ar. Gr. XV 117. 29; XVII 118.18. In the Theaetetus (145a, 145c) geometry 
is the subject best characterising the mathematical ability of Theodorus and Theaetetus. The 
importance of geometry is also related to the theory of recollection. Meno 82a-85b, 85e-d; Phaedo
73a. The view that geometry best characterises the Platonic education framework is also detected in 
Plato's Epistle III, where Dionysius II refers in particular to 'geometry' when he describes the 
education he received from Plato (319c). According to Plutarch, when Plato visited Dionysius II, 
'the palace was filled with dust, owing to the multitude of geometricians there' (Dion, 13). Drawing 
geometrical figures on loose sand strewn upon the floor is the causes of the dust.  In the 
Quaestiones Convivales (8. 2), Plutarch discusses the dictum ascribed to Plato, that God is always 
doing geometry, and illustrates Plato's philosophy in the light of the significance of geometry. 
Moreover, in Vitruvius (De Arch. 6.1) and Cicero (Rep. 1. 29), 'geometrical figures' appear as a 
symbol of 'the tracks of men (homimium vestigia)' and 'the indications of learning (doctrinae 
indiciis)'.  Philolaus A7a and Archytas B4 are also relevant here. 
10�I follow Rowe's translation. Rowe 1995. 
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Although the above passage speaks of two kinds of measurement, we might be 
surprised that the objects of the art of measurement include 'the number, lengths, depths, 
breadths and speeds'. 11  This means that arithmetic, geometry, stereometry and 
astronomy, which constitute the maq»mata in Republic VII, are subsumed under the 
province of this art of measurement (metrhtik»). The boundary between an art of 
measurement (metrhtik») and arithmetic (¢riqmhtik»), then, here becomes blurred. 
As Young Socrates appearing in the Politicus says, this province of the art of 
measurement as it appears at Politicus 284e ff is 'indeed a vast section (mšga tmÁma)'. 
This view of the art of measurement involving other areas of maq»mata might be 
ascribed to the 'komyo…' who claim at Politicus 285a1-2 that 'the art of measurement 
relates to everything that comes into being'. Yet, as to the problem of who the 'komyo…'
were, there is no solid evidence. Campbell says that they were Pythagoreans while 
Rowe claims that they were '(Pythagoreanising ?) members of the Academy. 12
Regardless of who the 'komyo…' might have been, what is more important for us is to 
consider why arithmetic (¢riqmhtik») came to be included in the province of 
metrhtik». The question seems relevant to the following passages where, on the 
contrary, the art of measurement is subsumed under the province of arithmetic:
Eleatic Stranger: '[if we were to see] all the science of numbers 
[arithmetic], whether - I imagine - dealing with pure numbers, or 
plane, or in depths, or in speeds, - in relation to all of these things, 
practised in this way, what on earth would be the result that 
would appear, if they were done on the basis of written rules and 
not on the basis of expertise ?' (Politicus 299e2ff) 
                                                                
11�It should be noted that ' tÕn ' attaches to 'number (¢riqmÕn)' while 'lengths, depths, breadths and 
speeds' are plural nouns without articles. Professor G. Lloyd suggested that the passage can be 
translated as 'measuring number, and 'lengths, depths, breadths and speeds' in terms of number, 
taking  ' tÕn ¢riqmÕn ' as accusative of respect. Moreover, it should be noted that, instead of 
'tacutÁtaj', 'pacutÁtaj' appears in some manuscripts (Bw).  
12�Campbell 1897: 107; Rowe 1995: 209. 
Apart from the context of the above passage which is concerned with which subjects 
may be studied and the limits of those subjects,13 it seems prudent to pay attention to the 
point that arithmetic (¢riqmhtik») is described as the study which deals not merely with 
pure numbers but also with other numbers relating to 'plane', 'depths' and 'speeds'.  The 
expression `sÚmpasan ¢riqmhtik¾n yil¾n e‡te ™p…pedon e‡t' ™n b£qesin e‡t' ™n
t£cesin oâs£n pou '(299e1-9), though being somewhat opaque, can be taken to 
indicate certain 'number sets' constituted by 'pure numbers', 'numbers relating to plane', 
'numbers in depth' and 'numbers in speeds'. What  precisely may be in Plato's mind is 
unclear, but one possibility is that 'all arithmetic' (sÚmpasa ¢riqmhtik¾) here 
embraces not just arithmetic but also certain aspects at least of what is elsewhere more 
generally described as belonging to the art of measurement. viz. when that deals with 
plane and solid geometry and speeds.  Although the word 'pou (perhaps)' suggests that 
such an assimilation is subject to qualification, we seem to have a contrast with the case 
at Politicus 284e2-8, where the province of the art of measurement (metrhtik»)
includes not only arithmetic (¢riqmhtik») but also other maqhvmata. Before 
investigating why arithmetic (¢riqmhtik») is to be assimilated to the art of 
measurement (metrhtik») or vice versa,  we must look at the following passage in 
Laws V:
The Athenian Stranger: 'He [the lawgiver] must recognise it as a 
universal rule that the divisions and variations of numbers are 
applicable to all purposes -- both to their own arithmetical 
variations and to the variations in terms of length and in depth, 
and also to those of sounds, and of motions, whether in a straight 
line up and down or circular.' 
(kaˆ koinù lÒgJ nom…santa prÕj p£nta e�nai crhs…mouj 
t¦j tîn ¢riqmîn dianom¦j kaˆ poik…lseij, Ósa te aÙtoˆ ™n 
˜auto‹j poik…llontai kaˆ Ósa ™n m»kesi kaˆ ™n b£qesi 
                                                                
13�Politicus 299b ff. 
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poik…lmata, kaˆ d¾ kaˆ ™n fqÒggoij kaˆ kin»sesi ta‹j te 
kat¦ t¾n eÙqupor…an tÁj ¥nw kaˆ k£tw for©j kaˆ tÁj 
kÚklJ perifor©j.) (Laws V, 746e-747a)
Here we see again that arithmetic (¢riqmhtik») embraces geometry, stereometry, 
astronomy and harmonics, these being the maqhvmata as they appear in Republic VII. 
This kind of unification of maqhvmata might reflect the view that the objects of 
maqhvmata are described in terms of 'the variations of numbers'. 
We see then that two rather conflicting tendencies appear in different passages in 
late Platonic works. One view has it that arithmetic is a study that in some sense 
embraces all the other branches of mathematics. The other has it that the art of 
measurement is a generic discipline, subdivided into arithmetic and other areas.  
Now Aristotle, in a passage in the Metaphysics (1020a7ff) that I have cited before 
(in chapter 3), arrives at a resolution of the problem by way of his introduction of the 
category of quantity (posÒn) that embraces both plurality (plÁqoj) and magnitude 
(mšgeqoj).14  But while that gives a clear taxonomy, within which the different and 
distinct subject-matters of arithmetic on the one hand, geometry on the other, can each 
be given their place, Plato, for his part, has no such category of quantity as such. 
Reflecting, as we have seen, the earlier tension in the dispute on the primacy of 
arithmetic and geometry, Plato adopts different orderings of the chief mathematical 
disciplines in different contexts and for different purposes. 
Very broadly speaking, the privileging of ¢riqmhtik», corresponds to a view that 
number is in some sense prior to and simpler than line, plane and solid. In that context 
Plato does not just suggest that the study of mathematics should start with arithmetic 
before progressing to the study of mathematical objects with two and higher dimensions. 
In some passages (as we have seen in Politicus 299e) it seems that other mathematical 
studies are, in some sense, reducible to numbers. We shall see the full development of 
that idea when we come to tackle the Epinomis. But for that reduction to be carried 
                                                                
14�See also Aristotle Physics 221b14 ff. 
through, one or other or both of two ideas have to be exploited. The first is that numbers 
have to be treated as including shapes, the second that shapes have to be seen as 
corresponding in some sense to numbers. Both ideas have their precursors in what is 
reported of Pythagorean ideas, but both seem to offer possible lines of interpretation of 
Platonic texts.
Yet the stronger the link between other branches of mathematics and arithmetic, 
deemed to be prior to the rest, the greater the potential problem posed by 
incommensurabilities. To cope with incommensurables the Greeks turned naturally to 
geometry. The relationship between the side and the diagonal of square was, indeed, not 
a relationship between two numbers (one rational, the other irrational), because the 
notion of an irrational number was not normally countenanced. Moreover, as we have 
seen, the key procedure adopted to show how some incommensurables were, after all, 
commensurable, and so in good order, was to move from lines to planes, and from 
planes to solids. Geometry and stereometry there performed invaluable services in 
securing order where disorder threatened. It is that idea that is often in the background 
when  metrhtikhv, rather than ajriqmhtikhv, is given primacy among the mathematical 
studies. It is by measuring things that the elements of limit and order in them can be 
discerned -- and that applies to what is numbered as much as what is measured in the 
fields of geometry, stereometry, astronomy and harmonics. As Politicus 284e shows 
Plato prefers measurement against the due measure to measurements of one thing 
against another. But his keenness on measurement of all kinds sometimes leads him to 
focus on it as the key issue for all the branches of mathematics to face. 
That Plato himself perceives no conflict between these two groups of ideas, the 
privileging of ajriqmhtikhv, and that of metrhtikhv, is strongly suggested by the fact that 
both figure in a single dialogue, the Politicus.  But that perhaps underlines that his 
interests were not solely in the abstract analysis of the ontology of mathematical entities, 
nor, again, solely in the links provided by the theme of measurement. He is, 
undoubtedly, deeply concerned with the notion of order and limit, with all of their 
applications, both mathematical and non-mathematical. But he allows his mathematical 
working out of those notions to vary in different contexts. 
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poik…lmata, kaˆ d¾ kaˆ ™n fqÒggoij kaˆ kin»sesi ta‹j te 
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kÚklJ perifor©j.) (Laws V, 746e-747a)
Here we see again that arithmetic (¢riqmhtik») embraces geometry, stereometry, 
astronomy and harmonics, these being the maqhvmata as they appear in Republic VII. 
This kind of unification of maqhvmata might reflect the view that the objects of 
maqhvmata are described in terms of 'the variations of numbers'. 
We see then that two rather conflicting tendencies appear in different passages in 
late Platonic works. One view has it that arithmetic is a study that in some sense 
embraces all the other branches of mathematics. The other has it that the art of 
measurement is a generic discipline, subdivided into arithmetic and other areas.  
Now Aristotle, in a passage in the Metaphysics (1020a7ff) that I have cited before 
(in chapter 3), arrives at a resolution of the problem by way of his introduction of the 
category of quantity (posÒn) that embraces both plurality (plÁqoj) and magnitude 
(mšgeqoj).14  But while that gives a clear taxonomy, within which the different and 
distinct subject-matters of arithmetic on the one hand, geometry on the other, can each 
be given their place, Plato, for his part, has no such category of quantity as such. 
Reflecting, as we have seen, the earlier tension in the dispute on the primacy of 
arithmetic and geometry, Plato adopts different orderings of the chief mathematical 
disciplines in different contexts and for different purposes. 
Very broadly speaking, the privileging of ¢riqmhtik», corresponds to a view that 
number is in some sense prior to and simpler than line, plane and solid. In that context 
Plato does not just suggest that the study of mathematics should start with arithmetic 
before progressing to the study of mathematical objects with two and higher dimensions. 
In some passages (as we have seen in Politicus 299e) it seems that other mathematical 
studies are, in some sense, reducible to numbers. We shall see the full development of 
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2.3 The significance of 'number' and 'measure' in the Laws : the 
mathematical foundation of divine necessity
I shall now present considerations suggesting that the concepts 'number' and 'measure', 
which we have so far been traced in the Philebus and the Theaetetus, play important 
roles in the Laws in underpinning not merely laws governing worldly and civic affairs 
but also the framework of the three maq»mata (arithmetic, the art of measurement and 
astronomy) in Laws VII, and furthermore the vision of the universe which we may 
detect in the Laws.
However, it might be objected that the three maqhvmata in Laws VII simply 
constitute part of the elementary education of the ordinary people and do not carry any 
philosophical message. The criticism might also be made that what is presented as a 
view of the universe in the Laws is at most the theological view that 'souls control the 
movements of the universe', and that we must wait for the so-called thirteenth book of 
the Laws, the (possibly inauthentic)Epinomis, before we find a vision of the universe 
founded on 'number' and 'measure'. Indeed, since Zeller,15 the majority of scholars have 
tended to deal with the Laws merely in the light of  Plato's view of education or his 
system of laws. Jaeger, for example, claims: 'The Laws contains neither logic nor 
ontology. . . it contains most profound discussions of the state, of law, of morals, and of 
culture. But all these subjects Plato subordinates to paideia [education].'16 A similar 
view was propounded also by Morrow. As Kahn puts it in his foreword, 'Morrow 
interprets the Laws primarily as a system of legislation rather than as a work of 
theoretical philosophy.'17 Such views reflect, even though they may not be derived from, 
a recognition that 'the word filosof…a does not appear in the Laws, and its cognates 
only rarely; and we hear little of the familiar doctrine of Ideas.'18
                                                                
15�See, Jaeger's brief survey of the history of the interpretations of the Laws. Jaeger 1944: vol. 3 
213. 
16�Jaeger ibid.. 
17�See, Kahn's foreword to Morrow (1993: xvii). 
18�Morrow 1993: 573. 
My interest in the Laws, however, lies neither in 'education' in the sense discussed 
by Jaeger nor in 'a system of legislation' as detailed by Morrow. Rather, I will explore in 
the Laws the view of the universe that is suggested by the framework of the maq»mata
that is there proposed. 
A clue to the view of the universe implicit in the Laws is the word '¢nagka‹a
(necessity)'. In Laws VII at 818a-e, Plato seems deliberately to exploit the semantic 
range of the word '¢nagka‹a (necessity)', in order to make a linkage between 'the 
indispensability of maq»mata (aÙtîn ¢nagka‹a)' (818a4), 'mathematical necessity 
(tÕ ¢nagka‹on aÙtîn)' (818a7) and 'divine Necessity (qe‹ai tîn ¢nagkîn)' (818b3, 
818b7-8). Such a linkage of the words 'necessity' might appear strange, because we are 
already familiar with the claim made in the Timaeus (48c) that 'Reason overrules 
Necessity by persuasion to achieve the best results'. Indeed, Necessity as it appears in 
the Timaeus indicates the Wandering Cause which originates in the physical properties 
of matter, and there is no indication in the Timaeus of the connection between 'necessity' 
and 'mathematics'. However, we should realise that the range of the concept 'necessity' 
is not restricted within the realm of Necessity as it appears in the Timaeus. We see, for 
example, in the Republic (V 458b), the concept 'necessity' is linked with 'geometry' and 
Plato contrasts the necessity of geometry with the necessity of love. Plato mentions: 'the 
necessities of love is far more influential and compelling than those of geometry' 
(Republic V 458b). In the Laws, the concept 'necessity' is linked with mathematical 
studies, and it is in the passage (Laws VII 818a-e) where the linkage is made. Let us 
examine this passage more precisely .  First, at Laws 818a4-5 the Athenian Stranger 
says, 'for the majority of the people it will be proper to learn so much of the matter [the 
three mathematical subjects; tr…a maq»mata] as is indispensable (Ósa
aÙtîn ¢nagka‹a), and as it may truly be said to be shameful to the ordinary people not 
to know'. Here the term  ' ¢nagka‹a ' relates to 'indispensability of the maqhvmata'. In 
the following statement given by the Athenian Stranger, we have a second, more 
complex, use of 'anagkaion': 'We simply cannot dispense with the necessity of the 
maq»mata (tÕ ¢nagka‹on aÙtîn)' (818a7). As Taylor points out, the 'necessity
(tÕ ¢nagka‹on)' at 818a7 can be construed as an echo of the 'indispensability of the 
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maqhvmata (Ósa aÙtîn ¢nagka‹a)' as it appears at 818a4. Yet we should not fail to 
notice that the 'necessity (tÕ ¢nagka‹on)' at 818a7 may capture not merely the 
indispensability of maq»mata but also the necessity inherent in mathematical 
knowledge. The mathematical necessity is then connected to the Necessity as it appears 
in the poem of Simonides: 'Not even God will ever be seen fighting against Necessity ' 
(818a7-818b3).19 Although Simonides, the original author of the saying, does not use 
the word Necessity in the sense of mathematical  necessity, the context in which the 
Athenian Stranger cites the dictum is a mathematical one, and that clearly opens up the 
possibility that we should think of the divine necessities here as including mathematical 
necessities. The Athenian Stranger goes on: 'No doubt he meant the Necessity which is 
divine, for if you understand the words of mere human necessities, like those to which 
men in general apply such sayings, they are far and away the silliest of sayings' 
(818b3-6). The nature of the necessities that are divine, not human, is clarified by the 
Athenian Stranger's answer to Cleinias' question at 818b. When asked what necessities 
belong to the maq»mata that are not of that sort (i.e. merely human) but divine, the 
Stranger replies: 
Athenian Stranger: 'Those [divine necessities belonging to the 
maqhvmata], as I believe, which must be practised and learned 
by every god, daemon, and hero, if he is to be competent 
seriously to supervise mankind: a man certainly would be far 
from becoming godlike if he were incapable of learning the 
nature of one and of two, and of even and odd numbers in 
general, and if he knew nothing at all about counting, and could 
not count even day and night as distinct objects, and if he were 
ignorant of the circuit of the sun and moon and all the other stars'. 
(Laws VII 818c) 
                                                                
19�This poem is also referred to in Protagoras 345d. 
From this it appears (1) that the divine necessities are exemplified by knowledge of 
numbers and of astronomy, (2) he who knows the divine necessities can become 
godlike. The various branches of mathematics have to be distinguished, and they have 
to be learnt in due order -- again a matter of what necessity has laid down (818de).  
As for (1), Plato does not mention the idea elsewhere in his corpus except in the 
possibly-inauthentic Epinomis where, as I shall discuss in the next section, special 
attention is given to knowledge of numbers and astronomy.20 Here, we may point out  
a piece of evidence concerning the link between the Epinomis and the Laws.
As for (2) --'the person who knows the divine Necessities (i.e. the mathematical 
necessities) can become godlike'--, no similar claim can be found elsewhere in the 
Platonic Corpus except in the Epinomis.21  Again, we may detect the link between the 
two works.  (2) is suggestive of the famous dictum attributed to Plato that God is 
always doing geometry,22 and the image of the Timaean Demiurge creating the universe 
by using 'numbers and shapes'.23
                                                                
20�Yet, why does not the divine necessity of the maqhvmata also entail knowledge of geometrical 
figures in terms of the analysis of shapes ? In considering this question, we should remember the 
suggestion made above that the art of measurement which deals with 'problems of essential nature 
of the incommensurable and the commensurable' can also be regarded as a part of arithmetic.  If so, 
the vision of the universe that lies behind the framework of the three maq»mata is not meant to 
exclude geometry, even though the emphasis is on numbers. 
21�For example, Epinomis 992c6, we fine the expression 'ÐpÒsoi qe‹oi', which indicates those 
having learnt maq»mata.
22�Plutarch, Quaest, conv. 718b ff. 
23�The motif 'to become godlike' also appears in Laws IV (716c): 
Athenian Stranger: 'In our eyes, God will be the measure of all 
things in the highest degree -- a degree much higher than is any 
"man" they talk of. So he who would be loved by such a being 
must himself become such to the utmost of his might.' (716d) 
While the first statement in the above passage can be taken as a variation on the famous 
Protagorean dictum that man is the measure of all things, we should not fail to notice that the 
statement is immediately followed by the sentence which uses the motif 'to become godlike'. The 
phrase 'such a being' at 716c6 refers to a God which is the measure of all things. We can therefore 
say that 'becoming godlike' means 'becoming like a divine measure'. If we link this consequence 
with the idea in Laws VII that 'the person who knows mathematical necessity can become godlike', 
we might arrive at the idea that mathematical necessity correlates not merely with 'numbers' but 
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Evidently throughout this text the use of the term 'necessity' shifts. At one end of 
the spectrum it relates merely to the indispensable parts of education (818a4). At the 
other there is talk of a divine necessity and of studies that can make you godlike (818b3, 
818b7-8, etc.). But what makes a human godlike is grasping mathematical truth -- 
especially those of arithmetic and astronomy --. Those, it would seem, are the 
necessities that not even a god would fight with.  
But one interesting feature of the studies itemised at 818de is that while the study 
of numbers is clearly identified, and so too the study of day and night and the circuits of 
the sun, moon and stars, there is no explicit mention of geometry as such. This might be 
thought particularly surprising in view of the importance of shapes in the work of the 
Demiurge in the Timaeus. However, the arguments we have adduced earlier in this 
chapter on the various views to be found in Plato on the relationship between arithmetic 
and geometry suggest that it would be unwise to conclude, from this text in Laws VII, 
that geometry is meant to be excluded. We should recall that, in certain contexts, at least, 
the study of numbers embraces that of plane and solid geometry, or the latter studies can, 
in some sense, be reduced to the former. The clear reference to metrhtikhv at 817e 
shows that, at the outset of this discussion at least, the study of the measurements of 
length, surfaces and solid is clearly included. On the basis of that mention, we would 
take it that the studies that should be distinguished, and tacked in due order, at 818de 
implicitly include plane and solid geometry. 
What emerges from Laws VII is a vision of the universe being governed by divine 
necessity, and that necessity relates to its mathematical structure. Higher education in 
mathematical studies may be confined only to a few, but its importance is still 
emphasised, for those studies enable one to become godlike and they give access to an 
understanding of the universe based on the two principles of number and measure. 
Let us now explore how the two concepts 'number and measure' are used 
elsewhere in the Laws.  In Laws V, the concepts 'number' and 'measure' play important 
roles in the laws governing worldly and civic affairs. The positive use of 'number' and 
                                                                                                                               
also with the concept 'measure'. The vision that the universe is governed by divine Necessity is thus 
grounded on the two principles of number and measure. 
'measure' in political and economical areas seems to reflect the idea that 'wealth and 
property must be rated by the same scale' (728e) because 'fierce and dangerous strife 
occur concerning the distribution of land and money and the cancelling of debts' (736c). 
Therefore, assurance for the stability of the State is sought in an organised numerical 
system (747a7), which Taylor translates as 'numerical standardisation'.24 Taking the 
example of the number '5040' which can be resolved into 59 factors, including all the 
digits from 1 to 12, 25  the Athenian Stranger states that 'this will give us our 
brotherhoods, wards, and parishes, as well as our divisions of battle and columns of 
route, and also the coinage system, dry and liquid measures, and weights -- to see, I say, 
how all these details must be legally determined so as to fit in and harmonise with each 
other' (Laws V 746d-e).26 This statement clearly indicates that 'number' and 'measure' 
are key concepts in the political and economical domains. Moreover, we have at Laws
V 741a the following statement: 
Athenian Stranger: 'My most excellent friends, be not slack to 
pay honour, as Nature ordains, to similarity and equality and 
identity and congruity in respect of number and of all that can 
produce fair and good effects. Above all, now, in the first place, 
guard throughout your lives the number stated [5040]; ...' (Laws
V741a7-b3)
The above statement throws further light on the significance of number in civic affairs, 
and in particular of its relation to the concepts 'similarity and equality and identity and 
congruity'.27 The Athenian Stranger seems to think that the role of number parallels 'all 
that can produce fair and good effects' which must of course include a God.  The 
proverb 'even a God cannot fight against necessity', which we saw in Laws VII at 818a-b, 
                                                                
24�Taylor 1934: 130.   
25�See also Burkert, 1972:431-432. 
26�Cf. England,1921 : 540-541, Burkert, 1972.: 431-432. 
27�We may also refer to Gorgias 508a, where the concept 'geometrical equality' appears. 
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chapter on the various views to be found in Plato on the relationship between arithmetic 
and geometry suggest that it would be unwise to conclude, from this text in Laws VII, 
that geometry is meant to be excluded. We should recall that, in certain contexts, at least, 
the study of numbers embraces that of plane and solid geometry, or the latter studies can, 
in some sense, be reduced to the former. The clear reference to metrhtikhv at 817e 
shows that, at the outset of this discussion at least, the study of the measurements of 
length, surfaces and solid is clearly included. On the basis of that mention, we would 
take it that the studies that should be distinguished, and tacked in due order, at 818de 
implicitly include plane and solid geometry. 
What emerges from Laws VII is a vision of the universe being governed by divine 
necessity, and that necessity relates to its mathematical structure. Higher education in 
mathematical studies may be confined only to a few, but its importance is still 
emphasised, for those studies enable one to become godlike and they give access to an 
understanding of the universe based on the two principles of number and measure. 
Let us now explore how the two concepts 'number and measure' are used 
elsewhere in the Laws.  In Laws V, the concepts 'number' and 'measure' play important 
roles in the laws governing worldly and civic affairs. The positive use of 'number' and 
                                                                                                                               
also with the concept 'measure'. The vision that the universe is governed by divine Necessity is thus 
grounded on the two principles of number and measure. 
'measure' in political and economical areas seems to reflect the idea that 'wealth and 
property must be rated by the same scale' (728e) because 'fierce and dangerous strife 
occur concerning the distribution of land and money and the cancelling of debts' (736c). 
Therefore, assurance for the stability of the State is sought in an organised numerical 
system (747a7), which Taylor translates as 'numerical standardisation'.24 Taking the 
example of the number '5040' which can be resolved into 59 factors, including all the 
digits from 1 to 12, 25  the Athenian Stranger states that 'this will give us our 
brotherhoods, wards, and parishes, as well as our divisions of battle and columns of 
route, and also the coinage system, dry and liquid measures, and weights -- to see, I say, 
how all these details must be legally determined so as to fit in and harmonise with each 
other' (Laws V 746d-e).26 This statement clearly indicates that 'number' and 'measure' 
are key concepts in the political and economical domains. Moreover, we have at Laws
V 741a the following statement: 
Athenian Stranger: 'My most excellent friends, be not slack to 
pay honour, as Nature ordains, to similarity and equality and 
identity and congruity in respect of number and of all that can 
produce fair and good effects. Above all, now, in the first place, 
guard throughout your lives the number stated [5040]; ...' (Laws
V741a7-b3)
The above statement throws further light on the significance of number in civic affairs, 
and in particular of its relation to the concepts 'similarity and equality and identity and 
congruity'.27 The Athenian Stranger seems to think that the role of number parallels 'all 
that can produce fair and good effects' which must of course include a God.  The 
proverb 'even a God cannot fight against necessity', which we saw in Laws VII at 818a-b, 
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appears just before the above statement (741a4-5). Referring to it, the Athenian Stranger 
explains that in order to maintain the appointed numbers of houses [5040], the people 
should be prepared to accept even an undesirable policy which a God might not want.
The Athenian Stranger says: 'If our citizens are visited by a flood-tide, as we may call it, 
of disease, or by destruction in battle, and so reduced far below the appointed number by 
untimely deaths, we ought not, of our own free will, to introduce new citizens trained 
with a bastard education, --but with "necessity" (as the proverb says) "not even a God 
can cope".'(741a). Once again necessity is associated with number, and this certainly 
helps to underline the importance of number in the political domain. However, here the 
context is that it is when disastrous calamity affects the state, that drastic measures have 
to be taken to ensure its continued well being. 
It is clear that in Laws V Plato pays special attention to the use of 'number' and 
'measure' in civic affairs. He also refers to the importance of the study of numbers. The 
Athenian Stranger says, 'in domestic, and public life and in all the arts and crafts there is 
no other single branch of education which has the same potent efficiency as the study of 
numbers (prÒj te g¦r o„konom…an kaˆ prÕj polite…an kaˆ prÕj t¦j tšcnaj p£saj 
›n oÙd�n oÛtw dÚnamin œcei pa…deion m£qhma meg£lhn, æj ¹ perˆ toÝj ¢riqmoÝj 
diatrib»)' (747b).  Accordingly, lawgivers are advised to study 'numbers'. The 
Athenian Stranger mentions that 'regarding numbers, every man who is making laws 
must understand at least this much, --what number and what kind of number will be the 
most useful for all States' (Laws V 738a); and also states that 'the lawgiver must keep all 
these [theories of numbers] in view and charge all the citizens to hold fast, so far as they 
can, to this organised numerical system' (747a).  Some have used the label 'number 
mysticism' to describe the familiar relationship we find between number and political 
policies.28 Yet that does not get us very far. Rather we should see all the passages in 
Laws V and VII, cosmological, educational and political, as making use of overarching 
concepts of 'number' and 'measure', to express the key ideas of limit and order.
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